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S 742G CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1971 
THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE 
ACT 
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to 
amend the Military Selective Service Act 
of 1967 · to increase military pay; to au-
thorize' military active duty strengths 
for fiscal year 1972; and for other 
purposes. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, first 
let me thank all my colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle for the very kind words 
they have ha~ to say about me. 
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, may we have order? 
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate 
will be in order. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Especially at the 
beginning of their speeches, sometimes 
before, and sometimes toward the end, 
they told me they were going to vote 
against the pending amendment. I ap-
preciate the good will and the good 
wishes. 
Mr. President, sometimes it takes a 
sledge hammer to make an imprint and 
place an issue on the table. I did raise 
this issue. I have l:leen raising it for 11 
years. I did not make the issue this time. 
But the issue has been made, and re-
gardless of the outcome of the vote to-
night, it will not disappear. It will not 
return to the cobwebs where it has rested 
so peacefully for the past two decades 
and 1 year. 
I shall try not to go back over what 
I have already said, because, while the 
debate has been considerate in part and 
emotional in part, in my opinion it has 
not been as practical as it might have 
been. There has been no hint of an un-
derstanding from downtown or from 
overseas. It was take it or leave it; and 
I am happy, speaking personally, that 
we are confronting this amendment on 
an up-and-down basis on the merits and 
unchanged. I have no regrets, no apolo-
gies, and no alibis, and I expect, at the 
very least, to achieve a minimum of that 
which I set out to attain. This matter 
now has been brought to the full atten-
tion of this administration as it was 
not in the previous Democratic adminis-
trations. This issue has now come to the 
attention of our NATO partners. 
It has come to the attention of the 
peoples who together comprise the 15-
Nation membership of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization. 
What I have endeavored to do is to 
move from the past into the present, 
and to look to the future. What I have 
tried to do is not to look over my shoul-
der in order to hang on to policies which 
were good two decades ago, and think 
that, despite the changing world, those 
policies are just as good and just as ef-
fective today. 
I had a part in setting up the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organizatwn-a minor 
part, because I served in the Houoe of 
Representatives at that time-but there 
are others here-! cannot name them 
all-Senator AIKEN, Senator YOUNG, 
Senator ELLENDER, Senator ANDERSON, 
Senator McCLELLAN, and others, who 
were in this Chamber when the great 
debate occurred 21 years ago which, on 
the basis of a congressional resolution, 
called for an increase of from two to six 
divisions in Europe. 
There was a question raised at that 
time as to how long they would be there, 
and I think the answer was "Not very 
long; a few years." 
As a matter of fact, I think it was 
Senator Robert Taft who raised that 
question in committee. But what we are 
faced with now, in my opinion, is not 
only the possibility of an indeterminate 
stay of 525,000 U.S. military personnel 
and dependents, but maybe a permanent 
stay. 
Why should not the Europeans want 
us to maintain this large force? Why 
should they not want us to send our sur-
plus generals and colonels there? Why 
should they not want us to continue to 
carry the greatest share of the burdPn-
not alone in our defense, but primarily in 
their defense? 
Thf'Y are better off by fa1· th<~n this 
country. If mv memorv sf'rves me cor-
rectlv, our debt Is eoual to the combined 
debts of all the other countries in the 
world. We have an un:emnlovrnent rate 
of 6.1 percent and an Inflation rate of 
5.7 percent. That is tod:'ly. And I do n"t 
want to look over my shoulder and thinlc 
that something that was good 20 or 25 
years ago cannot necessarily undergo 
a change today. 
I am not a member of thP. old lru"'rd. 
There is a chronolo!rlcal JZ'~D between me 
and the great maioritv Clf thP. people of 
this Nation who are under 30 YP"'rs of 
age, but there never will be a rredihilitv 
gap if I can helD it, becR.Ul'e I wl'nt to 
join them in facinJZ uo to the world of 
reality of todav, and I do not want to 
live in the past. I do not w11nt to return 
to the "gold old davs." I wRnt to face up 
to the responsibilities which are ours, in-
dividually and collectivelv, today. 
.Does the Senate want to do something 
about this situation in NATO? I think it 
does. I know it does. But the question is, 
will the Senate do something about this 
situation, which we all know calls for 
correction and which we all know will 
not be hidden under a shroud forever? 
Not from this week on. 
It was interesting to read the report 
of the Committee on Armed Services, 
now on Senators' desks, and on paJZe 35 
to find this item, under the heading: 
"Army": 
Second, th~re Is some reason to believe 
that there may be an excessive number of 
supply and logistics personnel In the U.S. 
Army forces in Europe. The Defense Depart-
ment has Itself recently conducted a review 
of these units and has reduced authorized 
streng.th in them by several thousand. But 
the Committee-
That is the Armed Services Commit-
tee, which is in control of the bill now 
before us-
believes there could be room for some further 
reductions. The detailed material in this 
area is highly classified but It should be 
noted that the United States cannot be ex-
pected to maintain a large supply and logis-
tlCs base in Europe to supporL hostilities for 
a long period of time when our allies are 
showing, by their stores of supplies and 
ammunition, that they cto not Intend to 
maintain the logistics base necessary for such 
lengthy hostilities. 
That is the end of the quotation from 
the report accompanying the bill now be-
fore the Senate for its consideration. 
Mr. President, the Senate confronts an 
issue of immense importance. The out-
come may well affect this Nation's pos-
tW'e not only with regard to Europe but 
also, to a great extent, to its role around 
the globe. In a very real sense, the Sen-
ate is today looking to the years ahead 
and to the policies and positions that 
will be relevant and productive. To be 
sure, what was done in the past was rele-
vant and productive. But the time has 
come, in my judgment, to stlike a course 
that will free us from certain shackles 
forged originally to bind us to policies 
and positions that have lost their mean-
ing. 
In cutting by one-half the level of U.S. 
forces in Europe, the amendment is de~ 
signed to put U.S. troop levels there into 
a contemporary perspective. Needless to 
say, I have been impressed by the inten-
sity of comment which this proposal has 
"prompted. It is a healthy sign of interest 
in our European policies--policies which 
have indeed suffered great neglect dur-
ing these past several years of tW'bulence 
in Southeast Asia. 
At the outset, I would like to note my 
respect for the alTay of statesmen who 
have spoken out on this matter. Many 
of them, in my opinion, will be judged 
exceedingly well by history. It was 20 
years ago, in a tim~ of ominous cold war 
tension, that many of them forged the 
powerful shield behind which West Eu-
ropean recovery was allowed to proceed 
securely. Their voices spoke then to a 
world still shaken in the wake of a long 
and devastating war. Their voices have 
been revitalized today, Mr. President. But 
the world they address is quite different. 
Europe's economic and social recovery 
has been remarkable; many of its mem-
bers are in a stronger position than we, 
and all are capable of doing far more 
than their present effort if they really 
believe ·their secm·ity is in danger. 
We no longer perceive a monolithic 
Communist bloc arrayed solidly against 
us. 
China and Russia now present the 
greatest threat tx> each other's security. 
The Iron Curtain has parted in many 
places, and relations between East and 
West Europe are rapidly improving. 
I cite these as a few examples of 
change. In spite of the changes, however, 
our NATO commitment of force today 1s 
not substantially less than when the Alli-
ance was entered 20 years ago. Indeed, 
consideling the awesome might of our 
tactical nuclear weaponry, it is far 
grewter. One final thought on this, Mr. 
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President. I would just say 1 hat nostalgia 
for great achievements in the past can-
not replace constructive approaches to a 
foreign policy designed for the future. 
It should be clearly explained, first of 
all, that it is not suggested by this 
amendment that we lei down our de-
fenses or abandon Western Europe. It is 
only suggested that we not remain frozen 
in an unrealistic and outdated posture; 
one that serves only to weaken us as a 
Nation. It is suggested that at long last 
we face up to the matter of reducing to 
realistic proportions our ganison in Eu-
rope along the lines recommended 10 
years ago by Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
Oh, but the same voices are heard ex-
pressing the same reasons. First, they 
exclaim that the possibility of detente 
will be jeopardized. But what has improv-
ing East-West relations to do with the 
present bloated level of U.S. farces in 
Europe? What is to prevent us from re-
laxing tensions if the fat is squeezed out 
of the military garrison there? What has 
the precise figure of 300,000 U.S. military 
personnel along with their 225,000 de-
pendents to do with easing tensions? 
Why not more? Why not less? Indeed, 
have not the West European nat10ns done 
very well themselves in easing East-
West tensions without much concern for 
the number of forces they have contrib-
uted to NATO? France has none. Ger-
many has fewer than it pledged. The 
United Kingdom has cut to the bone, and 
Canada is well on her way out. 
It all adds up to this Nation ca.rrying 
a very one-sided financial burden for 
NATO long past the time when the bur-
den of financial exchange shifted against 
us. In reply, it is said that the Europeans 
are making an effort. They are attempt-
ing to defray these ba!ance-of-payments 
losses. It was stated that through agree-
ments the Germans were purchasing 
quantities of U.S. equipment which, to a 
large degree, "offset" our expenditure in 
Germany But the so-called "offset" pro-
gram just does not withstand close 
scrutiny. 
This policy, Mr. President. began in 
the early 1960's. Formal offset agree-
ments have been in effect only between 
ourselves and West Germany, the recip-
Ient of the bulk of our NATO related 
expenditures. While the term "offset" is 
bandied about, it is understood that a 
substantial portion of the purchases are 
purchases which the Germans would 
have made here in the United States, 
anyway. In fact, it has been disclosed 
that in the beginning years of these ar-
rangements, several weapons systems--a 
large portion of offset sales--had actual-
ly been contracted for prior to the Ken-
nedy administration. This kind of "off-
set" is not my idea of a genuine extra 
effort which truly attempts to make up 
for our current heavy NATO burdens. 
By 1967, I might add, we adopted the 
temporary expedient of medium term 
securities, which, of course, only deferred 
the problem of our outlays. Moreover, the 
accumulation of such loans will in time 
only result in further German claims 
against our financial stability. 
The newest chapter, Mr. President, in-
volves a European willingness to defray 
directly about $200 million a year of our 
NATO expenditures in Europe. I suggest 
that when such an agreement is con-
summated, the balance of payments out-
flow from NATO may well have reached 
$2 billion. In this regard, the news on 
Monday about the first quarter balance-
of-payments def.cit is most alarming. 
If one were really serious about insist-
ing upon an equitable burden sharing 
within NATO, one would demand that 
our allies pick up the full amount of these 
expenditures, not a token 10 percent as is 
now mentioned. As has been pointed out, 
to reduce our real NATO budget, we need 
direct payments. Much more basic to the 
issue, however, is the fact that the idea 
of genuine burden sharing is but a pious 
hope. It was mentioned 20 years ago 
and has been talked about ever since. If 
burden sharing were the only issue here, 
then why not take congressional action 
with teeth in it: why not enact legisla-
tion that would require a full contribu-
tion from our allies? Let the European 
pocketbook determine how critically the 
Europeans view the presence of these 
300,000 American servicemen with their 
225,000 dependents. 
Though exceedingly important in the 
context of this debate, money is not the 
only question at stake. There has been 
the modified Mathias proposal; the Nel-
son proposal, the Dominick proposal, the 
Bayh proposal, the Percy proposal, and 
others; some emerged, some emerging 
and perhaps some yet to emerge. Though 
to varying degrees, most of these alter-
natives recognized the necessity for 
change; none I say, most respectfully, 
were willing to make the adjustment in 
clear and direct fashion. Indeed, most 
called for less than what 50 or more of 
my colleagues in the Senate in the past 
have called upon the Executive to do-
that is, to achieve a substantial reduc-
tion of U.S. troops in Europe. Most of 
the alternatives, be they perfecting 
amendments or substitute amendments, 
asked for consultations and negotiations. 
But we have consulted and we have ne-
gotiated this question year after year 
after year. There were calls, too, for 
progress reports by the President. But 
the President has reported. And progress 
has never proceeded. Time and time 
again we have admonished our allies to 
bear a fair share of the NATO burden; 
we have advised them about gaps in our 
planning assumptions and conventional 
forces; we have warned about the con-
sequences if they were not prepared to 
pull their own car. I submit that most 
of these alternatives--as modified or 
otherwise-merely asked that we embark 
on several more years of fruitless ne-
gotiations. I submit that no action on our 
part will meet with allied approval, no 
matter how much consultation; no mat-
ter how much negotiation. We have al-
ready paid too big a price for delaying 
this question with negotiations and 
consultations. 
And what have negotiations and con-
sultations wi~h the West Europeans 
wrought for our agricultural commu-
nity? My colleagues in this Chamber 
representing agricultural States under-
stand the problem only too well. It is 
simply time to indicate to the Europeans 
that we will stand firm for our interests; 
all of our interests. But, no, they say any 
adjustment downward of our European 
garrison somehow affects adversely every 
other part of the globe. 
Most notable is the warning that the 
amendment would impair the Middle 
East situation. I am frankly impressed 
with the sudden revelation to officials in 
the Government who for years have had 
difficulty seeing any serious Soviet threat 
to Israel. Suddenly they have seen the 
light and now urge opposition to the 
amendment because it alledgedly would 
hinder our abllity to aid Israel and would 
strengthen the Soviet hand in the Mid-
dle East. 
Mr. President, this claim is just not 
supported. The key to our air capability 
in the Mideast, in turn, is noL our Army 
in southern Germany. It is the airbases 
in Turkey, in Greece, and in Italy, for 
which we pay no small sums in terms of 
aid. 
But finally, we are told that unilateral 
reduction of our NATO forces would 
doom prospects of a complementary re-
duction of Warsaw Pact armies. It is said 
that if the amendment were adopted we 
could "kiss that possibility goodbye." 
Mr. President, that is just not so. 
Panoting it in one editorial or a hundred 
does not make it so. It is unfounded first 
of all, to suggest that U.S. NATO troop 
reductions provide the exclusive incen-
tive to East European troop reductions 
by the Soviets. It is no secret, for in-
stance, that Russia's need to strengthen 
its forces in the Far East continues more 
than ever today. At the same time, Rus-
sia continues to follow us in the costly 
and ever spiraling strategic arms race. 
And, no less than we, are the Soviets 
aware of the demands made by their 
entire defense budget upon the domestic 
economy. 
For all of these reasons-but primarily 
because of the tensions in the Far East-
Moscow has a very great incentive indeed 
to reduce its Warsaw Pact forces and 
redeploy them eastward. 
What makes the Russians hesitate? 
Clearly the dominant reason is the 
problem of political control in Eastern 
Europe. As Czechoslovakia revealed all 
too plainly, such control still rests ulti-
mately on military might. If Soviet 
planners find their Far East concerns 
sufficiently pressing, some reduction in 
Eastern Europe no doubt would be risked. 
Otherwise such a reduction is unlikely 
under any circumstances. 
So how does the size of NATO's army 
fit into this picture? I suggest, Mr. Pres-
ident, that cutting our Seventh Army 
forces is an equally reasonable way to 
induce the Soviets to reduce their man-
power in the satellites. I suggest such a 
cut on our part would act as effectively 
to obtain this end as would any force 
reductions reached mutually through 
long drawn-out negotiations. It is clear, 
too, that with a substantial reduction of 
our NATO contingent, the willingness of 
Eastern Europe to tolerate an undimin-
ished Soviet presence would be sharply 
reduced. Russia would be hard put to 
explain why it was necessary to retain 
such large forces to protect the satellites 
against a pruned-back NATO. 
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Indeed, it would not even be improb-
able to suggest that if one were a Soviet 
leader this past weekend, worried about 
the prospect of such satellite pressure, 
one might well have sought to defer any 
action on United States-European troop 
strength by calling for long, drawn-out 
negotiations. 
Another factor in Soviet reluctance to 
reduce its forces may actually be its as-
sessment of the NATO threat. Many So-
\iet experts argue persuasively that Rus-
sia's foreign policy remains a mixture of 
aggressive and genuinely defensive atti-
tudes. To the extent that this, too, is a 
factor in Soviet reluctance to reduce its 
Warsaw forces, a unilateral reduction by 
the United States cou'd be a positive 
factor in a Soviet willingness to make a 
suitable response. 
But, it will be said by some, what of the 
deep fear of Western Germany? The ar-
gument goes that with a reduced re-
straining presence of American forces, 
Germany may seek to expand its own 
military power. It is this fear that would 
harden Russia's present position in Eu-
rope. This is pure speculation. Not only 
does it ignore the fact that Bonn has no 
financial stomach for substantial military 
enlargement, but it also denies the grow-
ing preeminence of West Germany in the 
Common Market and its desire to retain 
its strong ties to the West and its eager-
ness for trade ties with the East. 
But even if I am wrong, that is no 
argument for hoping that simultaneous 
force reductions would result from nego-
tiations. If in fact Soviet reluctance to 
reduce its forces is dominated by fear 
of a nuclear West Germany unre-
strained by our presence, then it will be 
no more anxious to reduce its position 
in Central Europe through mutual force 
reduction talks. If the real problem is 
fear of a nuclear West Getmany, let us 
address that problem, and not talk about 
peripheral issues. In Southeast Asia we 
have learned too well the painful con-
sequences of failing to face up to and 
correct bad policy. We have busied our-
selves debating the more superficial is-
sues. On this matter, we need to clear 
the air with constructive action. 
Paring the issue down to its simplest 
terms, no case has been made that a 
reduction in half of our NATO forces 
would endanger the physical security 
of Western Europe. Why, it is asked in 
turn, should a unilateral effort to de-
escalate this European garrison be re-
jected? I do not oppose good faith talks 
with the Soviets or with anyone else. 
Indeed, the Nelson amendment would 
have paved their way. But since the So-
viets do have considerable independent 
mcent1ve to achieve force reductions on 
their own, what is so necessary about 
moving simultaneously? Our initiative 
would be a reduction, not an escalation 
of forces. Our initiative would ease ten-
sions, not aggravate them. Our initiative 
would enhance, rather than dimini~h. 
the prospects f{)r eventual mutual troop 
reductions in NATO. 
In summary, I would only stress again 
that this troop reduction amendment 
does not seek the end of NATO. It seeks 
only to reduce t', ~ size of the United 
States garrison in Europe. H seeks only 
to bring this Nation's fmancial contri-
bution to the NATO cause somewhat 
closer into line with that of other mem-
bers. 
It will not compel the complete with-
drawal of the United States from Eu-
rope. Indeed, n may help to prevent it. As 
I see it, the current financial crisis is 
only the handwriting on the wall on that 
score. It warns that our political and 
military role abroad which was estab-
lished in another time and circumstances 
is not properly adjusted to current needs. 
The adjustment is long past due in 
Europe. Unless it is made, I fear that all 
of our overseas commitments--the es-
sential, indeed, the vital-along with the 
superfluous, the antiquated, the irrele-
vant and the redundant, will be endan-
gered. 
This Government--the President and 
the Congress together-would be well ad-
vised in my judgment to update these 
commitments in concept and content. 
We need to look at Europe as it is today 
not as ~t was a quarter of a centtlry ago: 
not as 1t was at the time of Korea when 
the present size of the U.S. garrison in 
Western Europe was first established, at 
which time, incidentally, we first devel-
oped an interest in Southeast Asia-spe-
cifically in Laos, Vietnam, and Cam-
bodia. 
As the Senate commences to vote on 
this issue, I would only ask that each 
Senator consider the effect of the out-
come not in terms of what was right for 
yesterday, but rather in the context of 
what is needed for today and tomorrow. 
Mr. President, may I say in conclusion 
that I have asked no Senator, not one 
Senator, to vote for the pending amend-
ment; nor do I intend to do so now. 
The Senate is made up of mature inclj,.. 
viduals who represent sovereign States. 
Each Senator is capable of making up 
his own mind on the basis of the issue 
which confronts us at this time. 
As I said, I have no regrets and will 
have none, regardless of the outcome 
I will have no alibis. I will admit no mis~ 
takes in this case. If the amendment is 
defeated, so be it. If otherwise, there will 
be no sense of personal triumph may 
I emphasize. The issue has been ;aised 
and the raising of this issue is a matte; 
of moment for th:i:s body, for this Gov-
ernment, for our people, and for those 
of us who belong to the NATO organi-
zation. 
May I say that, as far as the Senate is 
concerned, in my opinion, nobody is going 
to take us to the cleaners. If we are taken 
in, we will be taken in by ourselves. We 
will have nobody to blame but ourselves. 
And, if we are, it will be too bad. 
The VICE PRESIDENT. Who yields 
time? 
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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
yield to the distinguished Senator from 
Arkansas. 
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the 
RECORD, immediately following my re-
marks, an article in yesterday's Evening 
Star by Tom Wicker, entitled "Mike 
Mansfield's Welcome Heresy." 
There being no objection, the article 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows : 
l\1IKE MANSFIELD'S WELCOME HERESY 
(By Tom Wicker) 
Sen. Mike l\Innsfield of Mont~ma has done 
us al! a sei-vice. II1s propo":J.l i o fore" a 50 
percent rcduc~wn In American forces in 
Europe hn.s made it clear 11ow difficult it is in 
this counry to chango a policy that hns 
achieved institutional stntuG, no matter how 
little sense the policy may have come to 
make. 
Mansfield's welcome Heresy f\lso has ex-
posed the extent to which American foreign 
policy-making Is dependent, not just upon 
the standards and concerns but even upon 
the personalit.lcs of the past. For not since the 
Grand Army of the R.epubllc held Its last en-
campment has there been such an ingather-
ing of elders and bygoners as President Nixon 
has mobllized in support of he proposition 
that NATO must never-no, never-be recon-
sidered like any other question of priorities. 
Never mlnd the crumbling and festering 
American city; never mind the mounting de-
mands for tax dollars for education, health, 
transportation, welfare, job training; never 
mind the cost of mnintaining a half-mlllion 
persons, including dependents and 12C gen-
era.J.s, as well as 7,000 tactical nuclear weap-
ons, in Europe; never mind the internn~lonal 
payments deficit to which this endless com-
mitment annua,lly ~ontrlbu~es $1.8 blllion.. 
Never mind aJ.1 that; the wisdom of the 
ages says NATO must go on essentla.J.Iy un-
touched. 
One primary argument against Mansfield's 
p=oposal is that since NATO is an alliance, 
the United Stat~s must not proceed unilat-
erally but only in concert with the other 
parties. 
The record shows, unfor~unately, that the 
French have pulled out, the Portuguese have 
their forces on ctuty maintaining their Afri-
can empire, Britain has eliminated conscrip-
tion, Canada hac cut its Enropean contin-
gent, etc., ad innfinitium. Who's unilateral? 
And who has borne the bulk of the load for 
two decades, with precious little help in 
sight? 
The other argnment is that Mansfield's 
proposal would sabotage any effort to follow 
up Brezhnev's sugg~stion that a reduction 
of forces and armaments 'n Europe might be 
negotiated by the NATO and WP.rsn.w Pact 
countries. 
0! course, when Brezllnev naid something 
about like that last yea!", nothing came of it. 
And the major reason Washington seems 
more interested this time vround !;; because 
'the Brezbnev proposal provides a handy ar-
gument again.st Mancfield's amendment. 
In fact, Nixon has made such a. concerted 
effor~ne of the most vigorous of his ad-
ministration-to defeat the Mansfield 
amendment oecause of the internal power of 
a policy long <!Stabllshed, j)articularly when 
those who est:o.bl!ahed it v.rc st!ll around to 
defend their handiwork. 
There is nothing to suggest that, before 
Mansfield acted, the adminintration had any 
great plans for negotiating troop reduction, 
either with the allies or the Soviets; and 
many of the patriarchs wllo were rushed into 
the breach have also opposed other move-
ments in the glacier of East-West relations--
say, Chancellor Er~ndt's efforts to begin So-
viet-German reconciliation. 
So the truth iG that, fer from being the 
disaster pictured at the White House, Mike 
Mansfield's amendment (which comes 26 
years after World War II ended and only 
after he failed to stir three admin!atratlons 
with milder proposa.J.s) not only shown us 
something about the viscid sense of priority 
and reality in government, it may also force 
some action at least, even 1t it is defeated 
this week. 
Having insisted that the Mansfield amend-
ment would kill any chance to negotiate. re-
ductions with the Soviets, the administration 
can hardly fall now to make e. ser!oUB etrort to 
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get such negotiations going; if it refuses to 
do so or if it backs off from any effective 
agree~ent, Mansfield and his supporters wl.ll 
be strengthened in future demands for uni-
lateral reductions. 
As the senator says of his amendment, "if 
defeated, it will not be dead." That means the 
issue is going to be forced-which, sadly 
enough, is about the only way issues ever get 
dealt with around here, in any admmtstra-
tion. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the 
Washington Post of June 20, 196~, on 
page 8 there is an art1cle headed Kis-
singer -" not Henry, but the Chancel-
lor-"Urges Europe Defend Self." 
Then under a dateline from Bonn, 
Germ~y. June 19, AP, "Chancellor Kis-
singer told the German Congress ye.ster-
day that it is a disgrace that Amencans 
must defend Europe.'' Descnbmg the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as 
the "optimum political solution" for West 
Germany, Kissinger asked: 
Is it not a disgrace that 200 million Ameri-
cans must protect 300 million Europeans? 
Mr. President, this was handed to me 
by a friend this morning. I had no 
knowledge of it before. If I had seen it in 
the press, I had overlooked it. Mr. Presi-
dent, for the past week we have heard 
the wailing of Cassandra from down-
town, uptown, on this floor, and from 
overseas. We have read it in the press. 
We have heard it from the mouths of 
horses, so that we should be shaking in 
our boots and we should be fearful that 
if we do' anything, the foundations of 
NATO will not only be shaken, but, 
loosened, and finally will crumble. 
Mr. President, we have listened to a 
considerable debate since the amend-
ment for U.S. troop reduction in Europe 
was introduced. It has been an informa-
tive debate which-has been interspersed 
with an input of additional ideas. I be-
lieve there is much sympathy with the 
purposes of the original amendment even 
as there are conce1ns about some of its 
implications. If I read the latter cor-
rectly, they have mostly to do with a pos-
sible loss of whatever opportunity for a 
mutual troop reduction may have been 
opened by the Brezhnev proposal of 
several days ago. 
Properly, Senators are considerate of 
the President's constitutional preroga-
tives which may be involved in this mat-
ter. By the same token, however, Sen-
ators are not unaware of the constitu-
tional responsibilities of the Senate. One 
of those responsibilities is to provide for 
the maintenance of U.S. military forces 
in such circumstances and only in such 
circumstances that the Congress may 
find appropriate. If I am not mistaken, 
most of the Members of the Senate wish 
to bring about a reduction in the cost 
and size of the U.S. deployment in 
Europe under NATO. I am aware that 
there is concern, however, lest the reduc-
tion proposed in the original amendment 
is too drastic and precipitous and so, up-
set what is certainly a cornerstone of 
U.S. foreign policy-the North At-
lantic Treaty. I stress the treaty which 
is fundamental to policy as distinct from 
NATO which is but the established mili-
tary mechanism derived from the treaty 
20 years ago in order to meet the situ-
ation then prevailing. 
I have given a great deal of thought 
to the understandable concerns of Sen-
ators. I have considered and reconsid-
ered both the perfecting amendment and 
the substitute amendment. It seems to 
me that the perfecting amendment, the 
Nelson amendment, as modified on yes-
terday, deals very effectively with the 
concerns. Clearly, however, it will not 
produce the U.S. troop reductions as 
promptly as the original amendment. 
It is my personal judgment now as it 
has been for some years that the U.S. 
contingent in Europe ought to be re-
duced without delay. It ought to be re-
duced with or without negotiations and 
quite apart from considerations of the 
international financial situation". It is a 
matter of principle; in my personal 
judgment, these troop reductions have 
been desirable and are desirable now in 
the interests of this Nation. In my per-
. sonal judgment, moreover, the cuts can 
be made now without doing violence in 
any way to our commitment to the At-
lantic Treaty or the opportunities for a 
negotiated detente. Excess, waste or ob-
solescence in the U.S. troop commitments 
under the North Atlantic Treaty, as I 
see it, are not bargaining chips in nego-
tiations; they are as an albatross around 
the neck of the Nation's basic policies. 
That is my personal judgment and the 
original amendment was a legislative ex-
pression of that judgment. Other Mem-
bers see it differently, a situation not un-
common in the processes of the Senate. 
The authors of the pending perfecting 
amendment clearly see it differently and, 
therefore, they would put off a legislated 
cut a while longer. For the present, they 
would entreat the President most ear-
nestly by this amendment to enter into 
negotiations with a view to mutual East-
West troop reductions-a step, in any 
event, which there is every indication 
that the ex'ecutive branch is now pre-
pared to take after years of reticence. 
May I say that is all to the good. The 
advice of the Senate or the Congress in 
a matter of this kind is most proper in 
a constitutional sense; it has been of-
fered many times to many Presidents. 
What impresses me even more in the 
pending perfecting amendment, however, 
as distinct from the proposed substitute 
which is to come later, is that this 
amendment would also provide, as does 
the original, for legislated troop reduc-
tions, although, on a very gradual basis. 
Specifically, the reduction under the per-
fecting amendment would be to 250,000 
by the end of fiscal year 1972; to 200,000 
by the end of fiscal year 1973; and, fi-
nally, to 150,000 by June 30, 1974. 
This provision, may I say, would be a 
most proper exercise of the constitutional 
authority of the Congress· regarding 
maintenance of the Armed Forces. Of 
course, the President may disagree with 
the proposed approach; indeed, he may 
express that disapproval by veto in the 
end. But the responsibility is in the Con-
gress, at this time, and specifically in 
the Senate. The responsibility to decide 
on troop reduction rests with the Senate 
at this point and now with the agents and 
drummers of the executive branch. The 
executive branch should no more presume 
to direct us in this matter than we should 
presume to direct the President in con-
ducting negotiations with the Soviet 
Union if he chooses to enter into them. 
And I must say that I am somewhat per-
tm·bed by the cavalier treatment of this 
fundamental constitutional distinction 
during the past few days. 
In my judgment, the perfecting 
amendment goes far to accommodate 
any reasonable needs of the President 
in the conduct of negotiations on troop 
reductions. It offers to suspend the op-
eration of the first cut in forces, and 
along a well-defined formula, which 
would otherwise be to 250,000 by June 30, 
1972, if by the end of this year, negotia-
tions are under way between the War-
saw Pact and NATO countries. If these 
talks are once begun, there will be no 
legislated reductions of U.S. forces what-
soever under this proposal for the next 
2 years. That would not preclude the 
President, of course, from acting on his 
own to make a drawdown at any time he 
sees fit. 
To me, Mr. President, this proposal 
commends itself to Senators who are pre-
pared to see the general purposes of the 
troop reduction amendment realized but 
at a much slower pace and after still one 
more effort to bring off effective East-
West negotiations on mutual reductions. 
It is an ingenious attempt to reconcile 
the constitutional responsibilities of the 
President and the Congress in a reason-
able fashion. 
I reiterate that the amendment does 
not bring about very promptly what I 
believe to be a most desirable adjust-
ment in our military deployment in Eu-
rope. It does, however, go beyond the ex-
pression of a sense of the Senate which 
is the substance of the substitute amend-
ment coming later and by means of which 
many of us thought, fruitlessly, to bring 
about a troop reduction in past years. 
The pending amendment has teeth in 
that it does put a legislative deadline on 
further Executive delays in this matter, 
even if the deadline is distant. I sho\.lld 
think that its passage would not inhibit 
the Congress from subsequently moving 
up that deadline if future circumstances 
should so indicate. 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 
minutes to the Senator from Alabama. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Alabama is recognized. 
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I thank the 
distinguished Senator from Mississippi. 
Mr. President, I oppose the Mansfield 
amendment, but I do believe that the dis-
tinguished majority leader should be 
givel'l the right to have his amendment 
voted up or down by the Senate. 
I believe 1;hat w1less any amendment 
to the Mansfield amendment is a vast 
improvement over the Mansfield amend-
ment it, too, should be rejected. 
Therefore, feeling that the Nelson 
amendment is not an improvement on 
the Mansfield amendment I will oppose 
the Nelson amendment, as well. 
The Mansfield amendment demobilizes 
no one; all it does is to seek the transfer 
of 150,000 of our soldiers. Already the 
number of men in the armed services is 
decreasing sensationally from around 3,-
500,000, which was the number on July 1, 
1968, to around 2,700,000 now. Under the 
terms of the draft extension bill, the 
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